Introduction
Ownership in sports, once exclusively considered as a passion-fueled play by billionaire individuals, has attracted involvement from institutional investors. In fact, Private Equity and Venture Capital-backed deals in sports services totaled $31.64bn in 2024, representing a 259% growth from the previous year.
The global branding, media revenue streams, and potential in commercial expansion that characterize sports services companies make them stand out as attractive investments in a scarce market. To evaluate the growth of PE in sports, this article will consider the evolution of PE’s impact in the sector, the reasons behind current momentum, the regulatory frameworks that characterize it, and the case studies that exemplify it.
Early Sports PE Investments
For most of the 20th century, sports assets were considered to be “trophy” assets, without much interest from private markets investors who were looking for stable businesses and predictable cash flows. The first attempts at PE investing in sports had mixed results. One of the earliest large-scale deals dates back to 2006 when CVC bought Formula One [NASDAQ: FWONA] – the auto racing monopolist – in a highly leveraged deal valuing the company at an enterprise value of $2bn. Through a series of operating adjustments as well as supported by secular trends that saw F1 become one of the most followed sports on the planet, CVC managed to accelerate the company’s revenues by more than 30% for multiple consecutive years, eventually exiting the investment ten years later, in 2017, selling for $8bn – a 4x MoM return. Perhaps the most interesting part of the Formula One deal was how it redefined the view on sports as unpredictable trophy assets. The crux of F1’s attractiveness lied in its unprecedently lucrative streaming rights which the company holds an exclusive license for till 2110. This predictable source of cash stood in contrast to the consensus that sprots assets are dictated by single team performance and fan sentiment. MotoGP followed a similar trajectory, but with a notable difference: unlike Formula One’s near-monopolistic global position, MotoGP competed in a more fragmented motorsport landscape. Bridgepoint’s [LSE:BPT] 2006 acquisition of Dorna Sports – the MotoGP’s commercial rights holder – therefore relied less on financial engineering and more on operational expansion – widening the race calendar, improving broadcast production, and standardizing the commercial framework across teams. While the asset lacked F1’s century-long media-rights tailwind, Bridgepoint succeeded in turning MotoGP into a more globally scalable product, ultimately exiting to Liberty Media in 2024 and proving that even non-monopoly sports IP can deliver strong, stable returns when professionally commercialized. A useful contrast to the abovementioned success stories is the 2007 acquisition of Liverpool FC by Tom Hicks and George Gillett. Unlike CVC’s and Bridgepoint’s investments in league-level rights holders with diversified revenue bases and monopsony power over their competitions, Liverpool was a single-club asset, structurally more exposed to on-pitch performance. The deal relied heavily on short-term, expensive debt pushed onto the club’s holding structure, with limited fresh equity and no credible operational turnaround plan beyond vague promises of a new stadium. As interest costs mounted and results deteriorated, the club was effectively trapped: the capital structure left little room for investment in players or infrastructure, exacerbating sporting underperformance. In contrast to the disciplined operational scaling seen in Formula One and MotoGP, Liverpool’s case showed the clear difference in risk profiles between league-level and club-level ownership as well as the importance of competence and execution with regard to value-creation.
Why Now?
The last five years have marked a shift towards higher private equity involvement in global sports as developments in technology and secular social trends allowed investors to look past the hurdles of low liquidity and reputational risks to try and benefit from the new opportunities. Fundamentally, the value of sports assets has always been embedded in their uniqueness – there’s only so many elite football or basketball teams with the sporting and cultural heritage in the world and that’s where their value comes from. However, in recent years a secular shift in media rights structure, cultural position of sports, and regulatory softening, created conditions that are uniquely attractive for capital.
The central driver of this is the evolution of media rights and streaming channels. Firstly, with the entry of new technology and proliferation of Direct-to-Consumer streaming platforms, consumers expect more immediate and flexible access than traditional TV channels. As of today, all top football and basketball leagues can be streamed via mobile apps and access to games can be bough on-demand. This shift of consumer preference towards more flexible access is a major inflection point as it unlocked new higher pricing benchmarks, boosting revenues and allowing for diversification from traditional TV streaming contracts for league-level owners and match-day income for club-level owners.
Secondly, sports have never been as integrated into the global culture as nowadays. Whether that’s football, auto-racing or any other sport, cumulative engagement across all social media and streaming platforms is at all time hight and growing. This allows individual sporting teams to become 24/7 multi-platform brands. The breadth and depth of sports-adjacent business has expanded significantly in recent years. The cross-sell of merchandise, films/documentaries, club-exclusive TV, and most-importantly, immense social media engagement, especially through short-from content platforms like TikTok, unlocks immense value both from direct revenue-generation standpoint, but also through improved global reach that attracts larger sponsorship deals. This growth in the breadth and value of various monetisation methods makes for a more attractive structure for PE investors seeking assets that can expand and improve under their ownership.
Finally, a key barrier to institutional investment in sports has been governance and ownership rules. Only recently have many leagues relaxed restrictions on private capital entering the market – opening the door to minority stakes, new ownership structures and alternative financing, both on club- and league-level. These regulatory shifts have enabled private equity funds to participate in sports in ways they could not before, making the asset class more investable.
Evidence of investor appreciation for these secular tailwinds can be seen in the rise of new sports-dedicated vehicles. For instance, Apollo Global Management [NYSE:APO] has launched a dedicated vehicle – Apollo Sports Capital – with an initial target of roughly $5bn aimed at clubs, leagues, media rights and venue financing. Meanwhile, CVC Capital Partners has set up its Global Sport Group with a commitment of about U$14bn, making it one of the largest sports-dedicated funds to date. Overall, the number of sports PE buyouts grew at a CAGR of 12% between 2018 and 2024, with the largest jumps of +28% and +16% in 2023 and 2024, respectively. This shows that investors see and appreciate the transformation of sports assets and are ready to deploy capital.
Rules of the Game: Who can own and how to make money?
Alongside PE’s presence in sports, regulatory frameworks of individual leagues have expanded into complex systems that welcome institutional investments without affecting the integrity of sports.
In the US, the NBA was the first league that introduced PE involvement. Regulating this, the league imposes that investment funds may only acquire non-controlling stakes of less than 20% in a single franchise, with an additional limit of ownership in a maximum of 5 teams. Since its implementation in 2020, this system has guided other American leagues. In fact, following this guidance, both the Major League of Baseball (MLB) and the National Hockey League (NHL) have implemented adjacent solutions. This structure prevents managerial control for institutional investors, whilst unlocking their value in capital markets: the funding raised from equity favors expansion through debt reduction or specific commercial initiatives like stadium developments.
In Europe, the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) guides regulation. In European football leagues, multi-club ownership in teams that compete in the same tournament is not permitted. However, various mechanisms have been implemented by funds to circumvent this framework with multi-club ownership under blind trusts, allowing for a separation between a fund and its ownership.
The rise of such methods has pushed UEFA to consider a regulatory relaxation, to balance the added value of PE capital and sport integrity. Compounding on this, a controversial scandal saw Eagle Football Holdings [EPA:EFG] in a multi-club ownership between English side Crystal Palace and French side Olympique Lyonnais. In fact, these clubs were both qualified to compete in the international “Europa League” tournament, leading to the expulsion of the English side, an action that led to re-considerations on the regulatory framework for the coming season following protests.
Case Studies for Private Equity Investments in the Sports Industry
As we have observed over the last few years, alternative investment firms have penetrated the sports market through both equity and debt investments, creating an outlook for exposure to the market, led by firms such as Apollo, KKR, CVC, and Sixth Street, among others.
Case Study I: Apollo’s £80m Debt Refinancing for Nottingham Forest
As the first case study, we have Apollo Global Management’s financing of Nottingham Forest Football Club through a £80m investment in senior secured debt, which exemplifies the growing convergence between private credit and professional sports finance. In an environment defined by higher persistent rates and more restrictive lending conditions, Apollo’s facility highlighted the evolving role of institutional capital as an alternative source of liquidity and stability for sports franchises facing mounting financial and operational pressures.
The £80m facility, initiated in December 2024, features a fixed annual interest rate of 8.75% and matures in three years, with a two-year extension available. The loan’s collateral comprises Nottingham Forest’s primary tangible assets: the City Ground stadium and the remainder of the club’s broader asset base and intellectual property. The structure of the deal comprises £55m allocated to refinancing prior floating-rate debt owed to media- and sports-focused lender Rights Media Funding, and £25m in financing allocated to new working capital to support operational liquidity needs. Upon completing the transaction, the refinancing allowed Nottingham Forest to stabilize interest payments amid a higher interest rate environment and mitigate refinancing risk amid volatile market conditions. The fixed coupon, albeit higher than traditional bank loan rates, reflects the premium associated with sports sector credit and private credit market norms.
From the borrower’s perspective, the refinancing achieved several strategic objectives. By locking in a fixed rate, Nottingham Forest effectively reduced its exposure to refinancing risk, which has characterized its prior debt arrangement. The new facility also improved cash flow management, enabling the club to better align its financial obligations with cyclical revenue streams, including broadcast rights, match-day income, and player transactions. The injection of fresh capital enhanced operational liquidity, offering the management team greater room to navigate wage commitments and transfer-market activities without immediate reliance on equity infusions from ownership. These benefits, however, came with structural tradeoffs such as the extensive collateralization of the club’s assets, including the City Ground, which significantly restricted future borrowing capacity, particularly for capital-intensive initiatives such as stadium redevelopments. Any future investment expansion would likely require either equity participation or subordinated financing, both of which could alter the club’s capital structure in less favorable ways.
For Apollo, the deal represented an attractive entry into the Premier League financing ecosystem and a broader strategic move within its sports investing platform. The transaction offered high-yield, asset-backed exposure with downside protection through collateralized debt. It also underscored Apollo’s role as a first mover among significant private credit funds in identifying sports as an underserved but resilient asset class capable of generating premium returns.
The risks embedded in the transaction remain material as Nottingham Forest’s revenue base is heavily concentrated in Premier League broadcasting distributions, meaning that relegation would substantially reduce earnings and impair debt-servicing capacity. The 8.75% coupon, though manageable under current revenue levels, represents a significant fixed cost in the event of performance-related revenue contraction. Furthermore, the loan’s maturity profile introduces future refinancing risk if capital markets tighten or the club’s valuation deteriorates. For Apollo, credit exposure to a performance-dependent borrower underscores the importance of conservative structuring and asset-based security in sports lending. At the same time, a successful transaction highlights the extent of private credit in smaller sports-related deals.
Case Study II: Boosting LaLiga: CVC’s Hybrid League Ownership Model
As the second case study, we will cover CVC’s entry into the sports private equity sector through its landmark partnership with La Liga, the Spanish football association. Diving into the transaction’s background, having taken place in December 2021, LaLiga entered a landmark partnership with CVC Capital Partners (through its Fund VIII), under the initiative labeled “Boost LaLiga,” which culminated in a €1.99bn commitment that marks one of the most significant private equity interventions in the European sports landscape. On the transaction, rather than acquiring direct equity in individual clubs within LaLiga, CVC obtained contractual rights to approximately 8.2% of LaLiga’s broadcasting and sponsorship revenue for the next 50 years, thereby establishing a hybrid form of investment that blends elements of private equity, private credit, and structured finance. The idea was motivated by two converging forces: La Liga’s need for modernization and capital injection amid intensifying global competition, and CVC’s strategy to deepen its exposure to recurring, inflation-linked sports revenues.
Diving into the transaction’s structuring, under the terms of the agreement, CVC created a dedicated subsidiary to receive its entitlement to future revenues, structured as a quasi-equity instrument. The €1.99bn contribution was distributed among 37 of LaLiga’s 42 clubs, proportional to their share of central broadcasting revenues. The facility was front-loaded, providing clubs with immediate liquidity to fund capital expenditure, digital transformation, and debt repayment. An interesting aspect is that the transaction follows covenants on how funds should be allocated: 70% earmarked for infrastructure development, digital innovation, and global expansion; 15% for player acquisitions; and around 15% for debt reduction and financial stabilization. The design ensured the funds were channeled toward long-term structural improvement rather than short-term wage inflation. LaLiga retained control over governance and regulatory compliance, while CVC’s role remained contractual and financial rather than managerial post-deal.
Going into the transaction’s valuation, LaLiga was valued at €24.25bn, implying a yield-adjusted valuation multiple that reflected both growth potential and long-term risk exposure. Importantly, CVC’s investment did not confer equity ownership or voting rights within LaLiga or its clubs. Instead, it established a new revenue participation model, granting the fund a fixed percentage of league-level commercial income for 50 years. This structure insulates CVC from club-specific volatility such as relegation or transfer shocks, while securing predictable cash flows from aggregate media and sponsorship contracts. As an interesting aspect, despite the club’s agreement, not all clubs joined: only 37 of 42 participated in the initiative, with Real Madrid, FC Barcelona, and Athletic Club Bilbao opting out. Their opposition to the agreement centered on concerns of undervaluation, excessive lock-in, and dilution of future revenue autonomy. They also raised legal challenges, arguing that the transaction violated Spanish sports governance statutes. However, Spanish courts upheld the arrangement’s legality, affirming that LaLiga had the statutory authority to engage in collective commercial ventures on behalf of its members.
Diving into the rationale for the multiple players in the deal, we start with LaLiga’s perspective, where by 2021 it is facing mounting pressure to adapt to a changing global football landscape. On this backdrop, the Premier League had solidified its finances through international broadcasting, while Serie A and Ligue 1 pursued private investment to stay competitive; meanwhile, Spanish clubs struggled with outdated infrastructure and mounting debt. The Boost LaLiga initiative was designed to revitalize Spanish football by modernizing its commercial foundation, expanding its international reach, and enhancing the financial and structural competitiveness of its clubs. The capital injection funded projects such as stadium renovations, digital fan engagement platforms, broadcast production upgrades, and advanced data analytics.
By allocating funding to modernization and digitalization goals, LaLiga positioned itself not just as a competition organizer but as a sports-entertainment brand, something sports brands have recently ventured into as club-to-sponsor partnerships have come to play a leading role in the market.
On the other hand, for CVC Capital Partners, Boost LaLiga fits squarely within its established sports investment strategy, following previous ventures in Formula One, rugby’s Six Nations, and international volleyball. The investment offered stable, inflation-linked revenue streams from media rights, sponsorships, and licensing, all of which benefited from the broader global growth of the sports-entertainment sector. Structuring the deal at the league level provided diversification across multiple clubs, reducing exposure to individual risks. Moreover, CVC’s limited operational role minimized reputational and managerial risks while maintaining strategic influence through contractual governance. Financially, the agreement offered a hybrid value, thus providing predictable bond-like returns with the potential for equity-style gains driven by LaLiga’s commercial expansion.
Despite its innovative structure, the Boost LaLiga transaction has attracted significant criticism. First, starting on the revenue Lock-in and opportunity cost, critics argue that assigning 8.2% of future revenues for 50 years constitutes an excessive concession relative to the capital raised, potentially constraining the league’s financial flexibility for decades, as future generations of clubs may inherit a much smaller revenue share due to the deal’s front-load capital injection.
Second, critics consider operational and market risk to be returns for both CVC and the clubs, as their returns remain tied to LaLiga’s long-term growth trajectory. Risks include broadcasting rights reinvestigations, piracy, shifts in consumer behavior, and secular macroeconomic conditions affecting advertising and sponsorship.
The subsequent risk lies in governance and equity tensions, as the non-participation of major clubs creates an internal asymmetry that could influence governance and collective bargaining. The fact that Real Madrid and Barcelona, the two most globally known Spanish football clubs, have challenged the transaction may continue to undermine centralization efforts and potentially weaken the collective revenue potential.
The Boost LaLiga vehicle has already influenced the trajectory of European sports financing. Its €24.25bn valuation and innovative revenue-sharing model set a precedent for similar deals across rugby, volleyball, and other football leagues. Advisory firms, including Rothschild & Co. and Duff & Phelps, oversaw valuation and structuring, framing the transaction as a template for hybrid financing in professional sports. From the proceeds of the liquidity injection, clubs have made measurable progress in increasing stadium capacity, developing digital content platforms, and expanding their international fan bases. Social media following across LaLiga clubs doubled, signaling improved global reach and commercial activation. At the same time, the full economic impact remains under assessment, and early data suggest tangible modernization gains across Spain’s football ecosystem.
Case III: The £4.25bn Chelsea Acquisition: Private Equity, Distress, and Strategic Rebuilding
In the third and last case, we have the acquisition of Chelsea Football Club by the consortium led by Todd Boehly and Clearlake Capital in 2022, which stands as a landmark private equity transaction in the global sports market. The deal combines extensive financial resources with strategic leadership to position Chelsea for long-term growth.
The deal, which was finalized on May 30, 2022, at a headline price of £4.25bn, involved extensive collaboration among major stakeholders and regulatory bodies. The transaction was precipitated by the UK government’s sanctions freezing Roman Abramovich’s assets, triggering a rapid government-facilitated sale process overseen by the Raine Group, which served as advisor to Chelsea. In the bidding process, Clearlake Capital emerged as the majority equity holder with an approximate 60% stake, while Todd Boehly, Mark Walter, and Hansjorg Wyss held the remaining stake. Governance rights were shared jointly between Clearlake and Boehly, installed as Chairman of the holding entity. Key legal and financial advisory support was provided by respected global firms, including Sidney Austin and Paul Weiss, ensuring comprehensive due diligence and regulatory compliance.
Financially, the transaction separated considerations into £2.5bn for the outright purchase of Chelsea FC’s controlling stake and an additional £1.75bn for capital expenditures. These committed funds were earmarked for the redevelopment of Stamford Bridge stadium, investments in the club’s academy, and community
Conclusion:
As explored, the growth of PE involvement in sports has stemmed from various factors and from an evolution that improved the attractiveness of this asset class over time. Secular tailwinds will continue to drive this growth, but the variation in success will strongly depend on the investment method use and investor’s competence. Individual club investments should continue to yield higher returns, but with higher risk exposure, while league-level and sports-adjacent investments should allow for better risk-rewards and diversification.
The regulatory framework on these competitions varies by league, type, and location, but there appears to be a balance between sports integrity and PE involvement that allows for low entry barriers. Moreover, the potential easing that is exemplified by the Eagle Football Holdings case shows that regulation continues to move more in favor of accommodating institutional investors.
These observations are also exemplified by our chosen cases. There is a clear strong variation in MOIC and exit-timing between each deal, that shows the unpredictability of investments in the sector: investors are often able to develop commercial growth and branding, but team performances are less influenceable. Overall, as noted in our cases, despite the difference in timings, exits tend to bring forward success to PE investors, showing the potential for this growth trajectory to continue and for investor involvement to continue rising.
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